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This paper examines the philosophical role of serious, chronic, or life-threatening illness.i 
Illness has been a theme in the history of philosophy, in particular in relation to its moral, existential, 
and spiritual value. For example, Epictetus (2004), Seneca (2004), Marcus Aurelius (1995), Boethius, 
and Descartes (1988) write about illness and its contribution to the modes and themes of 
philosophising, as well as the relationship between health and virtue, and health’s contribution to 
the good life (e.g. Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV, Seneca’s On the Shortness of Life, 
Epictetus’ Discourses and Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations). We find Descartes commenting in his 
Discourse on Method: “For even the mind depends so much on the temperament and disposition of 
the bodily organs that if it is possible to find some means of making men in general wiser and more 
skilful than they have been up till now, I believe we must look for it in medicine” (1988, 47). He sees 
health as “the chief good and the foundation of all other goods in this life” (ibid.). Perhaps most 
famously, Montaigne, following Socrates, claims that the whole point of philosophy is to prepare us 
for illness and ultimately death.  
Philosophical reflection on illness in the Western tradition has tended to be shaped by Stoic, 
Epicurean, and, later, Christian philosophies, each of which emphasise the importance of achieving a 
reflective coping with illness, seen as an essential feature of the world. Why this reflective attitude 
to illness is essential differs, though, by tradition. The Stoics seem to argue that everything that 
exists, including ostensibly bad things like illness, are all essential components of the rational order 
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of the cosmos, so the properly philosophical response is to recognise this and reflectively accept 
illness. We find Epictetus saying : “A man who has a fever may say: If I philosophize any longer, may I 
be hanged: wherever I go, I must take care of the poor body, that a fever may not come. But what is 
philosophizing? Is it not a preparation against events which may happen?” (Discourses, “In what 
manner we ought to bear sickness”). 
But for later Christian thinkers, such as Boethius, illness is a mark of our corrupt, imperfect 
state, and hence not an original feature of God's design. Boethius characterises wickedness of the 
soul as akin to bodily sickness; while the former deserve hatred, the latter should be treated with 
pity (Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV). So the properly philosophical response is to use illness in a 
doubly edifying way: first, as a reminder of the frailty and corruption of our mortal status and, 
second, as a source of moral and spiritual improvement (Kidd 2012). 
This is now largely a lost theme in philosophy because of the gradual erosion of philosophy’s 
phronetic role (although see Nussbaum 1994 ).ii I propose that this theme should be reawakened 
and that more work needs to be done to examine and describe the philosophical role of illness. This 
paper outlines some of the ways in which illness is philosophically relevant, as part of the attempt to 
ignite this reawakening (see also Kidd 2012). 
I suggest that illness is relevant to philosophy because it uncovers aspects of embodied 
existence and experience in ways that reveal additional dimensions of human life. It does this by 
broadening the spectrum of embodied experience into the pathological domain, and in the process 
shedding light on normal experience, revealing its ordinary and therefore overlooked structure. 
Illness broadens the range of bodily as well as mental experience (e.g. delusions, dementia). 
Moreover, illness is (at present) an integral part of biological life and thus must be taken into 
account when considering human life as a whole. Discussions of the good life, human relationships 
and ethics would be incomplete if they did not take into account the full spectrum of human life and 
experience, spanning sickness and health, childhood, adulthood, and old age. In addition, illness is an 
opportunity for reflection, because of its distancing effect, which illuminates taken for granted 
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values and expectations by destroying the assumptions that underpin them (e.g. assumptions about 
longevity, capability and autonomy). I suggest that these characteristics warrant illness a 
philosophical role.  
However, illness is a unique form of philosophizing. While the execution of most 
philosophical procedures, such as casting doubt or questioning, is volitional and theoretical, illness is 
uninvited and threatening. Illness throws the ill person into a state of anxiety and uncertainty. As 
such it can be viewed as a radical, violent philosophical motivation that can profoundly alter our 
outlook. I argue that the radical nature of illness should be utilised to sharpen and expand 
philosophical discussion.  
I conclude by examining the ways in which illness may impact upon the practice of 
philosophy. I argue that illness can be integral to philosophical method in a number of ways: in 
shaping and influencing philosophical methods and concerns, modifying one’s sense of philosophical 
salience and conception of philosophy, and increasing the urgency and appeal of particular 
philosophical topics.   
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section one outlines the centrality of the body for 
human experience and discusses how illness changes embodiment, meaning and being in the world. 
Section two discusses illness as a form of epoché performed through objectification and 
uncanniness. Section three discusses illness as a motivation to philosophise and outlines how illness 
may change our modes and styles of philosophising.  
 
1. Illness modifies embodiment, meaning and being in the world 
Three aspects of existence are significantly modified by illness: embodiment, meaning, and 
being in the world. Embodiment is the fundamental characteristic of human existence (Merleau-
Ponty 1962; Clark 1997, 2008; Wheeler 2005). Cognition and behaviour cannot be accounted for 
without considering the perceptual and motor apparatus that facilitates our dealing with the world 
(Calvo & Gomila 2008, 7). The body is the condition of possibility for perception and interaction with 
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spatial objects and our means for having a world. As Gallagher and Zahavi write “the body is 
considered a constitutive or transcendental principle, precisely because it is involved in the very 
possibility of experience” (2008, 135). Every worldly experience is mediated and made possible by 
embodiment (Zahavi 2003, 99). Or as Merleau-Ponty put it, the body is “that which causes [things] to 
begin to exist as things under our hands and eyes” (1962, 146).  
Counter to a purely naturalistic understanding, the body is not merely a thing among things. 
Embodiment determines spatial relations and temporal experiences, whilst also participating in 
these relations as a secondary form. The body is “the centre around which and in relation to which 
space unfolds itself” (Zahavi 2003, 99). According to Husserl, motility and tactile experience are 
fundamental not just for perception but for any organised subjective experience (Husserl 1997). In 
this sense the body is the foundation of human experience. As Taylor Carman writes, the body “plays 
a constitutive role in experience precisely by grounding, making possible, and yet remaining 
peripheral in the horizons of our conceptual awareness” (1999, 208). Or to use Merleau-Ponty’s 
famous formulation, the body is “our general medium for having a world” (1962, 146).  
The form of my embodiment serves as part of the background of my experience (Smith 
2007, 223). This structure defines, for example, the coordinate system of my visual field and my 
proprioception. Different sensory fields are bound together to create a unified stream of meaningful 
experiences, united by a body with an established repertoire of habits, activities, and style (on style 
see Meacham 2013). In Husserl’s terms, the constitution of my body is essential to the constitution 
of objects appearing to me and indeed to the constitution of space and time (Husserl 1997, §73).  
Given how central the body is, a change to a bodily function entails a change to one’s way of 
being in the world. Such a change will also affect the meaning of experience. For example, the 
experience of dancing will be radically altered by respiratory disease, both on the level of bodily 
feeling, which turns from a pleasurable experience to one of exertion, and on the level of meaning, 
when it changes from an experience of ‘I can’ to an ‘I cannot’ (cf. Carel 2012). The types of changes 
affected by illness may range enormously, from changes to sensory experience, meaning, and to 
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cognitive and emotional experience. If we think about symptoms as disparate as loss of mobility, loss 
of memory and incontinence, we can see that such changes are radical and remove the ill person 
from the realm of familiar, predictable and well understood experience. This displacement from the 
familiar destabilises the structure of experience and reveals new aspects of our being, such as our 
ability to adapt, mourning and dependency. The bodily foundations of autonomous adulthood are 
often removed, revealing the tentative and temporary nature of these foundations. Illness can 
disclose finitude, dis-ability, and alienation from one’s body as extreme modes of being.  
The philosophical illumination offered by the study of illness has been recently explored by 
Matthew Ratcliffe, who studied the experience of time in depression (2012b). Ratcliffe argues that 
there is strong evidence that the experience of time is affected in a number of ways in depression. 
He offers a phenomenological analysis of this experience, using Thomas Fuchs’ application of 
Husserl’s notion of retention and protention to the experience of time in depression. On this 
account time both slows down and accelerates in depression. This alteration to the normal 
experience of time can be explained by the effects of depression. On Ratcliffe’s account, depression 
removes meaning, obliterates the desire to carry out projects, and stops the attribution of value to 
different projects in the depressed person’s world (ibid.). Ratcliffe claims that the breakdown in such 
cases is not merely in the contents of experience but in the structure of experience itself.  
Because illness can affect many body parts and functions, it can delineate different aspects 
of embodiment by serving as a limit case (Carel 2013).iii The loss in illness may be of overall 
functionality, but also of flexibility and variability. With a narrowed spectrum of activity, one’s 
motility, assessment of duration, and notions such as ‘difficult’ and ‘far’, are modified. The 
restriction is not only a conscious understanding but underlies the kind of action one’s body 
spontaneously performs. Here is a description of such pre-reflective modification:  
Every time I tried – and failed – to do something that was too strenuous my body stoically registered 
the failure and thereafter avoided that action. The change was subtle, because this happened by 
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stealth […] I stopped feeling all the things I could not do. They were quietly removed from my bodily 
repertoire in a way so subtle I hardly noticed it (Carel 2008, 34).  
Illness may lead to a collapse of meaning, or what Heidegger calls anxiety (1962). In anxiety 
one’s overall sense of purposeful activity is lost, leaving the person experiencing anxiety unable to 
act. Action is grounded in meaning: I pull a shirt over my head in order to get dressed. I get dressed 
in order to go to work. I go to work in order to earn a living, and so on. Ultimately, this nested set of 
goal-directed activities comes to an end and human existence is ungrounded. A realisation of the 
groundlessness of human existence leads to what Heidegger calls anxiety (Angst). In anxiety 
purposefulness disappears and the meaning of entities is lost. They turn from being ready-to-hand 
(Zuhanden) entities we use (t-shirt, shoes, reading lamp) to being present-at-hand (Vorhanden) 
entities which confront us with their lack of usefulness, and hence their lack of meaning. In anxiety 
intelligibility is lost because the practical coherence of entities has been lost with the sense of 
purposefulness.  
Loss of meaning is often reported in cases of mental illness. Matthew Ratcliffe cites a 
schizophrenic patient who says:  
When, for example, I looked at a chair or a jug, I thought not of their use or function – a jug not as 
something to hold water and milk, a chair not as something to sit in – but as having lost their names, 
their functions and meanings (2013).  
Illness can also give rise to another kind of loss of meaning, related to the loss of the ability 
to perceive things as useful tools, and experiencing the contingency and irretrievability of meaning. 
In somatic illness a ready-to-hand entity like a staircase can turn from being a practical tool to being 
a present-at-hand entity, or even a conspicuous obstacle. S.K. Toombs, a philosopher suffering from 
Multiple Sclerosis, writes: “the bookcase outside my bedroom was once intended by my body as a 
‘repository for books’; then as ‘that which is to be grasped for support on the way to the bathroom’, 
and is now intended as ‘an obstacle to get around with my wheelchair” (1995, 16). Somatic illness 
may cause a sudden and often disturbing sense of the contingency of the meanings and uses we 
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assign to things: “The bookcase holds books. Of course it does! What else might it do? It might 
obstruct, impede, sadly remind …”. There is also a sense of the irretrievability of certain meanings: 
“the bookcase will always be an obstacle and will only cease to be so once I cease to be so”. The 
sense of inhabiting a space of possibilities can be replaced by a sense of this space becoming 
delimited and static. 
The changes brought about by illness are not localised to a specific object, but modify one’s 
entire interaction with objects and the environment, i.e., their being in the world. For a wheelchair 
user it is not just this shop or that doorway that are inaccessible, but the environment as a whole 
becomes less inviting or even hostile. Illness can expose not only the limits of human existence but 
also the biases of an environment.iv  
Illness may be philosophically salient in one of two ways. It is, in some cases, a severe and 
sudden disruption of our life. In this situation the illness is something foreign, threatening, and 
disruptive which we seek to get rid of. A bout of ‘flu or gastric infection are examples of this type of 
illness. This type of illness is philosophically useful because of its acute disruption of the everyday; it 
makes visible the taken for granted manner in which we structure our routine life. We take for 
granted that we can plan our day, perform a variety of activities and get from one place to another. 
These tacit assumptions are placed in abeyance in the case of a sudden illness. Feelings of missing 
out, being useless, and feeling unwell expose the underlying sense of participation, purposefulness, 
and potency that has been disturbed.v 
But illness may also appear more subtly and tacitly. The symptoms may be minor and not 
quite noticeable until they reach a certain threshold, or until they are picked up in routine screening. 
In this case the illness is not an acute disruption of the everyday, but still alters the everyday 
capacities of the ill person, and thus may also give rise to philosophical reflection, albeit of a 
different sort. Shaun Gallagher describes this kind of illness as one that “either sneaks up on us, or 
that we become so habituated to (perhaps because it won’t go away) that it defines our form of life 
– it becomes us, or we become it” (unpublished presentation). Whereas in acute illness the 
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expectation that the illness will ‘go away’ is very much part of the experience of illness, this 
expectation disappears in chronic illness. Arthur Frank contrasts his heart attack, which he 
interpreted as ‘an incident’, with his cancer:  
After an incident like my heart attack I was able to bounce back […] That’s accurate because in most 
cases we do not sink into an experience, we only hit the surface. I may have bounced back from a 
heart attack, but with cancer I was going to have to sink all the way through and discover a life on the 
other side (1991, 28). 
The second type of illness is not a disruption, but a “complete form of existence”, as 
Gallagher writes, following Merleau-Ponty (Gallagher, ibid.; Cf. Meleau-Ponty 1962). In this case, the 
disturbance runs deeper and longer, and thus must be dealt with in a different way than a passing 
illness such as food poisoning. When illness becomes a complete form of life, concepts (such as 
‘worthwhile’ or ‘difficult’) are modified, the expectations the ill person has of her life change, and 
her understanding of time and value needs to be readjusted. Chronic or progressive illness is a 
comprehensive realignment of meaning, values, and ways of being that culminates in illness 
becoming one’s complete form of existence. This process is a kind of distancing from one’s previous 
form of existence, and as such it throws it open to philosophical examination.  
 
2. Illness as epoché: objectification and uncanniness  
Because illness removes the taken for granted nature of motility and bodily capability, it 
makes what is normally natural and unreflective become artificial and conscious (Gallagher 2005). In 
this section I explain how this process gives rise to philosophical reflection. It is characterised by 
objectification and uncanniness which I use in this section to demonstrate the role of illness as a 
mode of philosophising.  
Illness can be seen as a crisis of meaning in one’s life. This crisis arises from a collapse of the 
ill person’s life narrative (Williams 2003) but also a disruption of routines, habits, expectations and 
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abilities. This disruption shakes one’s everyday life, and provides a distance from it. This distance has 
been described by Arthur Frank as a ‘dangerous opportunity’:  
Critical illness offers the experience of being taken to the threshold of life, from which you can see 
where your life could end. From that vantage point you are both forced and allowed to think in new 
ways about the value of your life. Alive, but detached from everyday living, you can finally stop to 
consider why you live as you have … (1991, 1).  
This brings to mind the ancient Greek conception of philosophy—introduced by Socrates and 
embraced by the Stoics, and later valorised by Montaigne—that to philosophise is to learn how to 
die (Montaigne 1993). Learning how to die in this context may mean more than accepting one’s 
mortality. It furnishes this highly abstract demand with concrete content. Learning how to die means 
learning to be ill, confronting pain and disability, accepting diminishing abilities and dealing with 
mourning, envy and sadness. In the words of Epictetus: “What is it to bear a fever well? Not to 
blame God or man; not to be afflicted at that which happens, to expect death well and nobly, to do 
what must be done” (Discourses, “In what manner we ought to bear sickness”).  
Illness calls upon the ill person to explore her life, its meaning, priorities, and values; this 
personal quest is well documented in sociology of medicine, medical anthropology, qualitative 
healthcare research, and cancer psychology (Brennan 2001; Thorne & Paterson 1998; Thorne et al 
2002). But illness can also be used as a distinctively philosophical tool to move beyond the 
idiosyncratic and personal to more general and abstract exploration of embodiment as a source of 
meaning and the condition of possibility for the self. In particular, the anxiety, loss of meaning and 
de-familiarisation described in the previous section give rise to a peculiar form of what Husserl 
termed the epoché, the bracketing of the natural attitude. The epoché asks us to dislodge ourselves 
from everyday habits and routines in order to reflect on them; this, I suggest, is what happens in 
illness, albeit in a raw and unformulated manner.vi Illness is a particular form of philosophical 
motivation, characterised by violence, negativity and being forced upon the ill person. The epoché 
asks us to shift our focus from objects to acts of perception, but does not involve ceasing to 
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perceive; it is not a sceptical procedure. It is not a removal from the world but a shift in a way of 
being in the world that enables philosophical reflection, without ceasing to take part in the world. 
Exercising the epoché involves stripping away of shared meaning, known uses and familiar 
connections between person and object. The object then becomes estranged and appears in novel 
ways. Thus the experience of illness, or anxiety, as a particular type of epoché can shed new light on 
taken-for-granted aspects of the world.  
Illness suspends the natural attitude - the taken-for-granted, meaning-laden and 
metaphysically determined way of experiencing the world. Such suspension does not mean doing 
away with the natural attitude, as that is impossible, but maintaining the attitude whilst suspending 
the underlying metaphysical beliefs underpinning it. This is the neutralization of one’s belief in the 
existence of the world or of an object, which Husserl called the epoché. This neutralisation is 
employed in the shift from the natural to the critical attitude (Drummond 2007, 67-68).  
We do not affect the epoché in order to “deny, doubt, neglect, abandon, or exclude reality 
from our research, but simply to suspend or neutralise a certain dogmatic attitude toward reality 
[…]” (Zahavi 2003, 45). Bracketing the natural attitude is a withdrawal from the ordinarily implicit 
commitment to the reality of the world (Ratcliffe 2008, 4). Bracketing turns the world into a 
phenomenon of being, instead of something that is. As Husserl makes clear, this is not a sceptical or 
idealist position. Rather, this ‘inhibiting’ or ‘putting out of play’ of the natural attitude exposes “my 
pure living [...] the universe of phenomena in the phenomenological sense” (Husserl 1999, 20). This 
suspension neither questions nor negates reality; rather, it allows under-theorised aspects of 
experience to become an object of enquiry, because it enables us to shift attention from the given 
object to the way in which it is given and its modes of appearance. As Husserl writes in Ideas I, “the 
whole prediscovered world posited in the natural attitude […] is now without validity for us; without 
being tested and without being contested, it shall be parenthesised” (1982, §32, 62). But 
importantly, the epoché “leaves everything exactly as it is” (Smith 2003, 23).  
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Zahavi characterises the epoché as a philosophical entry gate (2003, 46). I suggest that 
because of its de-familiarising effect illness is such an entry gate into philosophy. It is an invitation to 
investigate subjectivity under the conditions of illness, and thus to expand the conditions under 
which subjectivity is studied. As such it can reveal novel facets of subjectivity that otherwise remain 
unnoticed. For example, Merleau-Ponty gives a philosophical analysis of the case of Schneider, a 
World War I soldier with brain injuries, studied by neurologists Adhemar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein in 
1918 (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 103ff.). Merleau-Ponty interprets Schneider’s inability to perform 
abstract movements, initiate sexual relations, or stray from a daily routine as the breakdown of his 
intentional arc:  
[…] the life of consciousness – cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life – is subtended by an 
‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, 
ideological and moral situation […] It is this intentional arc which brings about the unity of the senses, 
of intelligence, of sensibility and motility. And it is this which ‘goes limp’ in illness” (1962, 136, my 
emphasis).  
This breakdown of normal human existence provides a unique opportunity to uncover facets 
of normal existence that are not visible under normal conditions. Similarly, Shaun Gallagher (2005) 
discusses the case of Ian Waterman, who suffered from de-efferentation from the neck down. 
Waterman was forced to use vision to locate his limbs and identify his posture. Gallagher uses this 
case to provide an in-depth account of normal proprioception.  
In illness, the epoché is forced upon the ill person, because of the modification to and 
limitation on her body imposed by illness. The ill person may have no interest in philosophy and no 
desire to undergo existential change. However, illness – an uninvited guest – forces itself upon the ill 
person, and compels her to modify and thus re-examine her bodily habits, existential expectations, 
experience of body, space and time, and way of being in the world (Carel 2012). Illness is a form of 
violent removal of the natural attitude, which enacts a philosophical procedure in a way that is far 
more brutal than usual philosophical reflection. Illness motivates ill people, and often those around 
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them, to confront practical concerns, and this, in turn, gives rise to theoretical reflection on one’s 
embodied situation. It is an uninvited type of reflection, but such coping with practical concerns 
reveals the normal conditions under which one previously operated in health. It replaces health, 
which is “life lived in the silence of the organs”, as the French surgeon Leriche wrote (cited in 
Canguilhem 1991, 91). This allows these conditions to be explored, as their silent function is lost and 
they become the object of explicit attention. The natural attitude is not immune to theorising or 
meta-reflection, under circumstances which disrupt it. Illness is one such circumstance.  
Merleay-Ponty characterises the epoché as an experience of “wonder in the face of the 
world” (1962, xiii). This sense of wonder, interrogation, puzzlement, characterises some experiences 
of illness. For examples, it drove Randy Pausch to write The Last Lecture, a series of talks about life 
and death, after being diagnosed with pancreatic cancer. “Many people might expect the talk to be 
about dying. But it had to be about living”, he writes (2008, 9). Because of changes to the somatic or 
mental architecture of one’s body (or mind), one’s contact with, and experience of, the world can be 
radically modified in illness. One’s sense of comfort and familiarity may be displaced by alienation 
and a sense of ‘not being at home’ (Svenaeus 2000). Merleau-Ponty writes: “[Reflection] slackens 
the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice; it alone is 
consciousness of the world because it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical” (ibid.). I suggest 
that illness is such a slackening of the intentional threads which reveals the world and embodiment 
as uncanny. In other words, illness problematises the relationship to one’s world, or one’s being in 
the world, thus lending itself to, or even forcing, philosophical reflection.  
The epoché also arises from the rift between the biological and lived body, which becomes 
observable in certain cases of illness. In health the two aspects of the body usually cohere, or 
respond in harmony to a normal range of experiences (but see Carel 2014). In illness the biological 
body comes to the fore, as it ceases to cooperate with the ill person’s desires. For example, a 
diabetic’s biological body will be unable to cope with a chocolate mousse, despite her lived body’s 
craving for it. In addition to the rift, the biological body also becomes the source of pain, disability 
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and failure. In this respect it becomes the source of negative experiences and the focus of medical 
attention, which often further distance us from it (Carel 2008).  
Lawrence Hass views illness as conflict between the biological body and life projects. Whilst 
the individual person’s ‘personal life’ is engaged in a project the biological body obstructs it. For 
example, one’s personal aim may be to become a parent. However, if the biological body is infertile, 
the result is a clash between the desire to have a child and the biological barrier. The impersonal 
operations of the biological body, over which we have little or no control, interfere with the 
intentional arc of the person, the meaningful connection between person and world which is aimed 
at a particular goal (Hass 2008, 87). This sense, that one’s body is an obstacle, a problem, something 
that is no longer well-understood, may initiate a kind of epoché. The metaphysical status of the body 
is thrown into question, because it is no longer familiar and predictable. In other words, the body is 
subject to a process of objectification in illness, as well as becoming uncanny – two processes to 
which we now turn.vii  
Objectification – the natural process secondary to experiencing the lived body is 
experiencing the body as an object amongst objects. In illness this process takes on a new 
dimension, as so much of modern medicine and the sciences underlying it rely on viewing the body 
as a physical object.viii This objectification takes place under the dual experience we have of our 
bodies. The body is experienced as both a lived, pre-reflective body (my first-person experience of 
and through it) and as an objectified, observed, spatial object (the third-person experience of it) 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962; Sartre 2003). It is both a physical object, made of matter, and the seat of 
consciousness.  
The exploration of objects implies a simultaneous self-exploration and self-constitution; 
there is a reciprocal co-dependency between the processes. “The world is given to us as bodily 
investigated, and the body is revealed to us in this exploration of the world” (Zahavi, 2003, 105). We 
are aware of perceptual objects because we are aware of our bodies and how the two interact. 
When we investigate objects, this is always accompanied by some kind of bodily self-awareness. In 
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illness objectification gives rise to a distance between oneself and one’s body, which is now reified 
into an object of medical inquiry and treatment. Objectification breaks down the natural taken-for-
granted attitude towards the body, the seamless unity between the body as object and the body as 
subject.  
Merleau-Ponty claims that the body is the first object we perceive as an object, thematising 
and learning to interpret and judge it according to cultural standards (Merleau-Ponty 1962). Prior to 
that event, I do not experience my body; rather, I experience through my body. As Zahavi writes, 
“Originally my body is experienced as a unified field of activity and affectivity, as a volitional 
structure, a potentiality of mobility, as an ‘I do’ and ‘I can’” (2003, 101). Illness impedes the natural 
sense of ability and activity, and enables us to explore the volitional structures of embodiment. Our 
natural orientation is one in which the body serves as the perceptual centre of our experience, with 
our attention directed away from it, rather than to it. The negative, unwanted focus on the body in 
illness reorients our attention back towards the body, but this time viewed as an object. Many of us 
have had the experience of seeing an x-ray of scan of our bodies and having to relate our subjective 
feeling of our body to this objectifying image.  
The duality of the body plays a complex role in healthcare provision. The health professional 
experiences the patient’s body as an object, but is also aware of its subjectivity (so will apologise for 
having cold hands when touching a patient). The patient may feel objectified by the physician’s gaze, 
but this objectification is only possible because she is first a subject (Carel & Macnaughton 2012). 
The physician perceives an appearance of an experienced object: a swollen arm. The patient 
perceives a localised sensing: the sore arm. She may also be shown an x-ray of her arm, and will thus 
oscillate between the two experiences – the immediate pain localised in the arm, and the arm as an 
object that is gazed at and imaged. She can focus on the sensing (observing the swollen arm) or the 
sensed (the arm itself), and each will yield a differently thematised experience.ix Health professionals 
often view the body as thematised and objectified, focusing on a particular organ or function in 
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order to understand it as a medical object. But for the patient, the awareness of her body as an 
object is secondary to her subjective experience of receiving healthcare.  
As Fredrik Svenaeus claims, modern medicine expands the objecthood of the body through 
imaging and conceptualisation of organs, functions, and molecular processes (2012). The medical 
emphasis on the objecthood of the body contributes to the rift between the body as lived and the 
biological body. This intense experience of the objecthood of the body in illness alienates the patient 
from her body. Jean-Dominique Bauby, who suffered a stroke that resulted in locked-in syndrome 
writes:  
Reflected in the glass I saw the head of a man who seemed to have emerged from a vat of 
formaldehyde. His mouth was twisted, his nose damaged, his hair tousled, his gaze full of fear. One 
eye was sewn shut, the other goggled like that doomed eye of Cain. For a moment I stared at that 
dilated pupil before I realised it was only mine (2007, 32-3).  
As this passage shows, illness may force us to adopt a reifying and abstract view of our own 
body – this is often the shift that is required from patients when discussing their disease with health 
professionals. However, although most of us can adopt an abstract view of our body, we are not able 
to sustain it; that is existentially unbearable. We cannot actually view ourselves objectively in any 
sustained sense, and it is unrealistic to expect that of others. Health professionals need to be aware 
of this because of medicine’s way of privileging third-person perspectives. Objectivity is seen as an 
ideal by many health professionals, but when subjected to philosophical analysis, it can be seen that 
merely relying on an objective stance is a naïve and non-practicable ideal that ought to be replaced 
with a more nuanced understanding of intersubjectivity. 
A further objectification takes place in the clinic. When a patient awaits her blood test 
results, she is as ignorant about her cholesterol levels, for example, as an objective observer. When 
she asks the physician ‘how bad is it?’ that is because she is genuinely unable to access this 
information by examining her bodily sensations. In that sense the patient’s body is an object not only 
to the physician but also to the patient herself. Other experiences of objectification can be seen in 
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the encounter with medical technology. Seeing one’s tumour as a set of CT images, or aligning your 
limbs for a bone density scan, can make the objecthood of the body prominent in one’s experience. 
These objectifying experiences may lead to a sense of alienation from one’s body, and to treating 
that body as an aberrant object over which one has little control. The ill body becomes despised, 
feared, and alien.  
However, this objectification is not complete. There is an oscillation between treating one’s 
own body as an object of medicine and the subjective experience of apprehension, feeling cold, or 
flinching from the physician’s touch. Husserl’s example of two hands touching each other makes this 
duality salient (Husserl 1999). When the right hand is the active, touching one, it is at the same time 
being touched by the left hand. If we consciously decide to reverse the roles and concentrate on the 
left hand as touching, we still oscillate between both dimensions, the active touching one and the 
passive dimension of being touched. According to Husserl, this duality of experience is a unique 
feature of human existence. In order to touch, one has to be a thing among things, a physical object. 
As such an object, one has to be open to the possibility that one can be touched. However, in illness 
the natural movement between the two dimensions is disrupted because the passive dimension 
becomes prominent. For example, internal examination gives rise to an experience of being touched 
from within (e.g. one’s cervix or intestines), expanding the domain of passivity. The body as object 
takes precedence in the clinical context, and its foreignness is accentuated by the inaccessibility of 
some medical facts to the patient other than via a third person report. In illness one’s body becomes 
an object in ways it would not otherwise have.  
Uncanniness – In illness the body becomes an obstacle and a threat, instead of my home, a 
familiar place I inhabit. A change to one’s body is a change to one’s sense of being at home in the 
world. The body ceases to be the ‘null centre’ of my orientation towards the world (Smith 2003, 221) 
and instead becomes the source of negative experiences. The primitive sense of ‘I can’ becomes 
replaced by a conscious, artificial, mediated sense of ‘I cannot’, or ‘I once was able to but am no 
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longer’ (Kesserling 1990). The perspicuous nature of bodily orientation as being the foundation of all 
experience becomes occluded with attention.  
Illness can suspend the familiar setting and feelings that underpin normal everyday actions, 
giving rise instead to an experience of ‘being not at home’ (Svenaeus 2000, 9; 2012). Uncanniness 
arises most forcefully from the disruption of this background, which happens as a result of changed 
embodiment. Our concepts, habits, routines, expectations, and norms may be disrupted, or even 
destroyed by illness. Uncanniness arises from a new, negative focus on one’s body, a sense of this 
body becoming an alien destructive force, or even the threat of annihilation that become salient in 
serious illness. This changes the ill person’s relationship to her environment, as well as her concepts. 
Illness causes disruption of the lived body, which interrupts the relationship between one’s body and 
the environment. Concepts like ‘far’, ‘difficult’, and ‘heavy’ change their meaning for the individual, 
who may experience a further sense of alienation because her new use of concepts moves away 
from the norm. In addition, such concepts acquire new objects, e.g. routine activities such as 
carrying a laptop bag, or nipping upstairs to pick up one’s wallet, become marked as difficult in 
illness. Many concepts change their meaning, as well as attaching to new objects, and so expanding 
in scope. The change is not merely linguistic; the ill person actually experiences the physical world as 
less welcoming, full of obstacles, difficult. Distances increase, everyday routines take up more time, 
activities have to be forsaken or redesigned, and so on. Toombs describes loss of mobility as 
“anchoring one in the Here, engendering a heightened sense of distance between oneself and 
surrounding things” (1990, 11). Illness modifies not only one’s body, but one’s sense of space.  
Not only the experience of space and the use of concepts change in illness, but also the 
experience of time may change and contribute to the sense of alienation and uncanniness brought 
about by bodily changes, fear, pain, and limitation. Sustained pain or a poor prognosis may 
completely transform one’s experience of time (Toombs 1990). Activities may take more time, and 
thus expand, or may become impossible, which may cause the ill person to experience herself as 
‘useless’ or as more disabled than she is (Toombs 1988). Insecurity and anxiety about future health 
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and ability may make one focus on the present (Carel 2008, Chapter 5). And memories of a healthy 
past become objects of regret, yearning, or a sense of discontinuity (Bury 1982). The experience of 
time may also change in response to an uncertain prognosis. Priorities might change and it is an 
opportunity to question how one has lived and how one would like to live (Lindsey 1996; Lindqvist et 
al 2006). These changes are fundamental and may lead to seismic shifts in identity and selfhood 
(Williams 2003) as well as triggering philosophical questions. How plastic is the experience of space 
and time? What determines ‘normal’ experience? Can there be continuity in identity and 
personhood given the radical change in one’s experiences of these fundamental categories? The way 
in which such questions can arise by bodily modification in illness demonstrates that illness can 
trigger philosophical activity. We now turn to examine in what ways this triggering is philosophically 
salient.  
 
3. Illness as invitation to philosophise  
So far I have explained how illness can be philosophically illuminating, by disrupting 
everyday taken-for-granted assumptions about embodied existence, and thus performing a kind of 
epoché.x In this section I look more closely at this process, and suggest that illness is a peculiar kind 
of motivation to philosophise.  
Illness is unwanted; it is almost never welcome or easily accepted into one’s life. It is also a 
radical event: it gives rise to a rethinking of values and meaning, given the changed life conditions. 
Illness changes our relationship to our bodies, our environment, our plans, and judgment. In short, 
serious illness is a dramatic life event that affects all aspects of life. Because of these features illness 
can motivate philosophical reflection. However, the claim I wish to make is not simply that illness 
motivates the person who falls ill to become more reflective, although this is certainly true, but 
rather that the features that motivate reflection in individuals who become ill make illness salient to 
the practice of philosophy.  
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Illness certainly invites or inspires reflection of a philosophical sort. But it can also brutally 
force this reflection on ill people – for example, the way a poor prognosis may force the ill person to 
consider death. It also forces the ill person to consider such issues not in the abstract – a luxury of 
the healthy and young – but in their most intrusive application to one’s own life. Illness does not 
permit inauthentic reflection on death, for example, as an abstract, far away event that may befall 
one at some point in the future. Illness forces the ill person to face her own death in the most 
concrete possible way. From practical arrangements to choosing one’s funeral song, writing a will or 
saying what is pressing, illness is a strict philosophical instructor forcing the ill person to confront 
death in its most concrete and immediate. This can be seen as a fuller, more existentially salient 
form of philosophising. Indeed, for Heidegger, authentically facing death demands precisely this kind 
of first-person engagement with death. 
Illness is also different to other motivations to philosophise. Whereas normally one chooses 
to perform a philosophical procedure, of say, questioning or criticising an argument, illness 
motivates in a non-volitional manner. It is violent, unwanted, destructive and uncontrolled. In this 
sense illness forces the ill person to reconsider their situation. We normally take the practice of 
philosophy to be a matter of choice, whereas illness is almost never something we choose to happen 
to us. We think of reflection as a pleasant experience of intellectual challenge; but the reflection 
prompted by illness is all-consuming, extreme and terrifying.  
Nietzsche argued that physical illness affords insights into the body, life, and indeed reality. 
He saw illness as instructive as well as edifying, claiming that careful philosophical attentiveness to 
experiences of illness is an important feature of an examined life. Nietzsche describes how his illness 
sharpened his perceptions and inspired his philosophical view:  
It was as if I discovered life anew, myself included; I tasted all the good things, even the 
small ones, as no other could easily taste them – I turned my will to health, to life, into my 
philosophy […] the years when my vitality was at its lowest were when I stopped being a 
pessimist (2004, 8). 
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Illness affects different aspects of philosophical reflection: it can call for more radical and 
personal methods, such as existentialism or nihilism. It affects the philosophical concerns of the ill 
person – issues such as death, the good life, the injustice of the natural lottery, and time can be 
central and pressing for ill people in a way they would not be otherwise. Because it forces the ill 
person to engage with their physical or mental decline and death, it triggers reflection on finitude, 
dis-ability, suffering, injustice, and so on. Similarly, the urgency and salience of particular 
philosophical topics may change in light of illness (e.g. Seneca’s On the Shortness of Life (2004)). The 
very activity of philosophising may change and become more urgent and personal. Illness may also 
change the ill person’s conception of philosophy (if she has one) as a vital practice aimed at a good 
life, rather than an abstract theoretical enquiry seeking truths, for example, as can be seen in 
ancient philosophical schools such as the Epicureans and the Stoics. Illness may also bring about the 
sense that philosophical enquiry ought to be integrated into, and so intrinsic to, one’s life as a whole. 
A case in point is Alasdair MacIntyre (1999), who stresses the fact of our vulnerable, dependent, 
afflicted state as a precondition for a style of moral philosophising attentive to the human condition. 
An important caveat is that illness does not always or necessarily fulfil its role as inviting to 
philosophise. It is disorientating and overwhelming, and can – like other extreme hardships – destroy 
reflection instead of bringing it about. Illness is not philosophical reflection in itself, but can be – and 
often is – a way into reflection. Illness is a compulsive invitation to philosophise:  
The experience of illness and its sweeping effect on every aspect of life shocked me into thinking 
about these issues. I found that I had to reinvent my life… I learned to rethink my aspirations and 
plans. I relinquished the sense of control I previously had… My experiences pushed me to reflect on 
health and illness (Carel 2008, 7).  
“True philosophy”, Merleau-Ponty wrote, “consists in relearning to look at the world” (1962, 
xx). Illness forces us to relearn not just to look at the world, but also to cope with it, to negotiate 
new limitations and to continue to live to the best of our ability within new constraints brought 
about by illness. The consequences of such coping with practical limitations can be existential and 
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philosophical illumination. Perhaps illness is a kind of philosophical method, which illuminates 
normalcy through its pathological counterpart. However, Merleau-Ponty calls on us to make this 
claim carefully:  
It is impossible to deduce the normal from the pathological, deficiencies from the substitute 
functions, by a mere change of the sign. We must take substitutions as substitutions, as allusions to 
some fundamental function that they are striving to make good, and the direct image of which they 
fail to furnish (ibid., 107-8).  
Merleau-Ponty is acutely aware in this passage that the pathological is not merely ‘a change 
of the sign’. Rather, pathological cases allude to some function they are ‘striving to make good’ and 
in this striving end up creating a complete form of life. It is this completeness that requires further 
philosophical investigation, to unravel how what may seem pathological and deficient may give rise 
to phenomena such as adaptability (Carel 2007) and edification (Kidd 2012). Canguilhem defined 
disease as “a new way of life for the organism”, the creation of new norms that govern the 
relationship of the diseased organism to its environment (1993, 84). The richness of the experience 
of illness and the understanding of health and illness as distinctly normative activity attest to the fact 
that illness both requires and merits further philosophical exploration. 
 
Havi Carel 
Department of Philosophy 







22 | P a g e  
 
This paper was written during a period of research leave funded by the Leverhulme Trust and 
revised during a period of leave funded by the British Academy. I am grateful to both funders. I 
would like to thank Ian James Kidd for helpful comments and suggestions that greatly improved the 
paper. I also thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments. 
 
References 
Aurelius, Marcus. 1995. Meditations. New York & London: Penguin Books. 
Bauby, Jean-Dominique. 2007. The Diving Bell and the Butterfly. London: Harper Perennial.  
Boethius. 2004. The Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. H. R. James. 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14328/14328-h/14328-h.htm (accessed on 20 August 2013) 
Brennan, James. 2001. “Adjustment to Cancer - Coping or Personal Transition?”. Psychooncology 
10(1):1-18.  
Bury, Michael. 1982. “Chronic illness as biographical disruption”. Sociology of Health and Illness 4(2): 
167-182.  
Calvo, Paco and Toni Gomila. 2008. Handbook of cognitive science: An embodied approach. Oxford: 
Elsevier.  
Canguilhem, Georges. 1991. The Normal and the Pathological. New York: Zone Books. 
Carel, Havi. 2007. “Can I be Ill and Happy?”. Philosophia 35(2):95-110.  
Carel, Havi. 2008. Illness. Stocksfield: Acumen.  
Carel, Havi. 2010. “Phenomenology and Its Application in Medicine”. Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 32(1):33-46.  
Carel, Havi. 2012. “Phenomenology as a Resource for Patients”. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
37(2):96-113. DOI: 10.1093/jmp/JHS008 
Carel, Havi. 2013. “Illness, Phenomenology, and Philosophical Method”. Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 34(4): 345-357. DOI 10.1007/s11017-013-9265-1 
23 | P a g e  
 
Carel, Havi. 2014. “Conspicuous, obtrusive, obstinate: a phenomenology of the ill body”, in Medicine 
and Society, New Continental Perspectives, ed. D. Meacham. Dordrecht: Springer (in press). 
Carel, Havi and Jane Macnaughton (2012). ““How do you feel?”: oscillating perspectives in the 
clinic”, The Lancet 379(9834): 2334 - 2335 (23 June). DOI:10.1016/S0140-6736(12)61007-1 
Carman, Taylor. 1999. “The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty”. Philosophical Topics 27(2):205-226.  
Clark, Andy. 1997. Being there. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Clark, Andy. 2008. Supersizing the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Drummond, John. 2007. Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy. Lanham MD: Scarecrow Press.  
Epictetus. 2004. A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion. Trans. G. Long. 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10661/10661-h/10661-h.htm (accessed on 20 August 2013) 
Frank, Arthur. 1991. At the Will of the Body. Boston :Mariner Books.  
Gallagher, Shaun. 2005. How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Gallagher, Shaun. 2009. “Illness as a Complete Form of Existence”. Unpublished presentation 
delivered at the Association for Medical Humanities Annual Conference, University of Durham.  
Gallagher, Shaun and Dan Zahavi. (2008). The phenomenological mind. New York: Routledge.  
Hass, Lawrence. 2008. Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
Heidegger, Martin. 1962[1927]. Being and Time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
Husserl, Edmund. 1999 [1931]. Cartesian Meditations. Dordrecht: Kluwer.  
Husserl, Edmund. 1982 [1913]. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.  
Husserl, Edmund. 1997 [1907]. Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907. Dordrecht: Kluwer.  
Kesserling, Amy. 1990. The experienced body, when taken-for-grantedness falters: a 
phenomenological study of living with breast cancer. PhD Dissertation available via UMI. 
(unpublished).  
Kidd, Ian James. 2012. “Can Illness Be Edifying?”. Inquiry 55(5): 496-520. 
24 | P a g e  
 
Lindqvist, O., Widmark, A. & B.Rasmussen (2006). “Reclaiming Wellness – Living with Bodily 
Problems as Narrated by Men with Advanced Prostate Cancer”. Cancer Nursing 29(4): 327-337.  
Lindsey, Elizabeth. 1996. “Health within Illness: Experiences of Chronically Ill/ Disabled People”. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 24, 465-472.  
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1999. Dependent Rational Animals. London: Duckworth. 
Marotta, Jonathan J. & Marlene Behrmann 2004. “Patient Schn: has Goldstein and Gelb’s case 
withstood the test of time?”. Neuropsychologia 42:633–638.  
Meacham, Darian. 2013. “What goes without saying: Husserl’s notion of style”. Research in 
Phenomenology 43: 3-26. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1962 [1945]. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. C. Smith. Routledge: 
New York and London.  
Montaigne, Michel de. 1993. “To Philosophise is to Learn How to Die”, in The Essays : A Selection. 
London : Penguin, pp.17-36. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2004. “Why I am so Wise”. In Ecce Homo, 7-18. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nussbaum, Martha. 1994. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Pausch, Randy. 2008. The Last Lecture. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
Ratcliffe, Matthew. 2008. Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Ratcliffe, Matthew. 2012a. “Phenomenology as a form of empathy”. Inquiry 55(5): 473-495.  
Ratcliffe, Matthew. 2012b. “Varieties of Temporal Experience in Depression”. Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 37(2): 114-138. 
Ratcliffe, Matthew. 2013. “Phenomenology, Naturalism and the Sense of Reality”. In Phenomenology 
and Naturalism, H. Carel and D. Meacham (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 2003 [1943]. Being and Nothingness. London: Routledge.  
Seneca. 2004. On the Shortness of Life. London: Penguin Book. 
25 | P a g e  
 
Smith, Arthur D. (2003). Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations. London & New York: Routledge.  
Smith, David. W. 2007. Husserl. London & New York: Routledge.  
Svenaeus, Fredrik. 2000. “Das Unheimliche – Towards a Phenomenology of Illness”. Medicine, Health 
Care and Philosophy 3:3-16.  
Svenaeus, Fredrik. 2012. “Organ transplantation and personal identity: How does the loss and 
change of organs have effects on the self?”. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy37(2): 139-158. 
doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhs011 
Thorne, Sally and Barbara Paterson (1998). “Shifting images of chronic illness”. Journal of Nursing 
Scholarship 30(2): 173-178.  
Thorne, Sally, B. Paterson, S. Acorn, C. Canam, G. Joachim & C. Jillings (2002). “Chronic illness 
experience: insights from a metastudy”. Qualitative Health Research 12:4, 437-452.  
Toombs, S. Kay. 1988. “Illness and the Paradigm of Lived Body”. Theoretical Medicine 9:201-226.  
Toombs, S. Kay. 1990. “The Temporality of Illness: Four Levels of Experience”. Theoretical Medicine 
11: 227-241.  
Toombs, S. Kay. 1995. “The Lived Experience of Disability”. Human Studies 18:9-23.  
Toombs, S. Kay. 1999. The Meaning of Illness: A Phenomenological Account of the Different 
Perspectives of Physician and Patient. Amsterdam: Kluwer. 
West-Eberhard, Mary-Jane. 2003. Developmental Plasticity and Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Wheeler, Michael. 2005. Reconstructing the cognitive world. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Williams, Simon J. 2003. Medicine and the Body. London: Sage Publications.  
Zahavi, Dan. 2003. Husserl’s Phenomenology. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. 
                                                 
iIn the remainder of the paper I will use the term ‘illness’ to denote serious, chronic or life-
threatening illness, rather than common and transient illnesses, such as ‘flu. However, less serious 
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conditions can also be philosophically important, as they disclose more minor interruptions to the 
flow of experience. Sartre (2003) gives the example of a headache as disrupting reading. 
ii There is much discussion in the philosophy of medicine about the concept of illness (and disease), 
and its relationship with the concept of health. But this conceptual analysis does not touch on the 
existential or philosophical role illness may have. For a notable exception see S.K. Toombs, The 
Meaning of Illness. 
iiiDeath would not be the ultimate limit case but crossing the limit. 
ivThis bias underlies academic research in fields such as disability studies, gender studies, queer 
studies, black studies, Deaf studies, and so on. Academic inquiry in these fields is, in part, motivated 
by identifying biases and discrimination. 
vThe experience of ageing may also give rise to these sensations, but more gradually than sudden 
illness. 
viDistancing can also arise as a result of other life events, for example bereavement, divorce, and 
trauma. 
vii Young, healthy embodiment is typically oblivious to the possibility that the body might be 
experienced in this way. The confidence in one’s physical and cognitive capacities can occlude a 
sense that these capacities might change (even with natural ageing) and that this change will 
increasingly come to radically impact one’s identity. This can be seen as a failure of moral 
imagination, compassion, humility, or even a misunderstanding or denial of the biological expiration 
that delimits human life. 
viiiThis is a good thing. Modern medicine has made huge progress because of this objective view of 
the body. 
ixThe health professional may also alternate between the sensing (her experience of gazing at the x-
ray or examining the arm) and the sensed (the arm or the x-ray), but this oscillation does not involve 
self-objectification. 
27 | P a g e  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
x This process may affect family members or carers who become distanced from shared practices 
and understandings by the limitations of illness. 
